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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
On August 27–28, 2012, in Atlanta, Georgia, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
hosted the Radiation Emergencies Public Health Roundtable: The Role of Poison Centers. This roundtable 
brought together professionals who work at poison centers (PCs) across the United States for a training 
session that was followed by a discussion of the current and potential roles poison centers have in radiation 
emergency preparedness and response. 
Methodology 
The roundtable opened with a four-hour session covering basic radiation physics, types of radiation 
emergencies (both radiological and nuclear), and the public health response to such incidents. The next 
eight hours were dedicated to the roundtable discussion. A total of 36 people participated in the two-day 
roundtable; they represented 32 PCs that serve 37 states and the commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Public 
health officials representing Georgia and Alabama participated in the discussions, and representatives from 
the American Association of Poison Control Centers attended to observe the proceedings. In addition to on-
site participation in Atlanta, the session was available via Webcast to all 57 PCs in the United States. 
Findings 
Although the nation’s PCs have limited experience with managing exposures to ionizing radiation and 
contamination with radioactive material, they expect to receive calls from the public, health care providers, 
and the media after a public health radiation emergency. The main role of PCs during a radiation 
emergency will be to provide accurate, uniform information to callers. PCs can provide nationwide, near 
real-time situational awareness data through use of the National Poison Data System (NPDS) to help guide 
public health response and messaging. In addition, PCs can potentially assist in triage and management of 
callers and act as an information resource for radiation medical countermeasure (MCM) use. Although PC 
call line surge capacity may be limited, many PCs have surge call distribution capabilities. The current 
capacity of the aggregate call system is unknown.  
Conclusions 
The nation’s PCs will be involved during a public health radiation emergency. If properly engaged, they 
can be an asset for public health. The primary role of PCs during the response to a public health radiation 
emergency will be to provide accurate, uniform information to callers. Other important roles may include 
using NPDS to augment public health messaging and risk communication, assisting with caller triage and 
management, and supporting follow-up activities. To enhance preparedness, PC personnel need further 
training on radiation-related health effects and the management of persons with exposure to ionizing 
radiation or contamination with radioactive material. Improving collaboration and planning between PCs 
and state and federal agencies is crucial to enhancing radiation emergency preparedness. 
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BACKGROUND 
After the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, the ensuing Japanese nuclear 
power plant emergency renewed concerns among officials and citizens of the United States regarding 
contamination with radioactive material and the need for MCMs to protect the public’s health. To assist 
Poison Centers (PCs) responding to calls, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reviewed 
specific FAQs developed by the American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) and PC 
toxicologists regarding the Japan radiation incident. The purpose of the CDC review was to ensure uniform 
messaging. Additionally, radiation experts from CDC and the Radiation Emergency Assistance 
Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) communicated with PCs to assist with calls related to the Japan incident. 
The nation’s PCs, particularly those in the West Coast states, received numerous calls requesting 
information about protective actions for contamination with radioactive material and exposure to ionizing 
radiation. The calls focused on (1) whether there was a need for such pharmaceutical interventions as 
potassium iodide and (2) food safety issues. CDC analyzed PC call data in order to target communication 
messages effectively. 
Previous audience research has indicated that the public as well as clinicians and public health officials 
want toll-free “hotlines” that they can use to speak with knowledgeable individuals to obtain factual 
information about radiation and protective measures, especially information about MCMs for treatment of 
contamination with radioactive material and exposure to ionizing radiation. PCs are well known as credible 
resources for information about toxic substances, and they can play a valuable role in providing expertise 
and information following a radiation emergency, whether of a real or a perceived nature. PCs are already 
used extensively by medical facilities, individual clinicians, and the general public; they receive more than 
four million exposure and information calls in a year. All calls are electronically reported to the National 
Poison Data System (NPDS), a near real-time surveillance system that is monitored by AAPCC and CDC. 
PCs’ existing capabilities include 24-hour, live health care professional availability; automated regional 
routing using a single toll-free number; experience with risk communication to the public; medical 
toxicology consultation expertise; and existing relationships with state health departments. These 
capabilities can be leveraged for an effective public health communication strategy during a radiation 
emergency. 
As noted by CDC speakers at a March 2010 Public Health Grand Rounds session, there is a lack of 
sufficient radiation subject matter expertise, as well as education and training, for emergency responders. 
These shortcomings also apply to PCs. Calls about radiation are not as frequent as calls about other topics; 
therefore PCs may lack sufficient knowledge of such topics as ionizing radiation, the health effects of 
radiation exposure, contamination with radioactive materials, and appropriate MCMs to treat each. 
CDC’s National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH) and its Health Studies Branch (HSB) and 
Radiation Studies Branch (RSB) proposed to fill identified knowledge gaps by organizing an educational 
session, followed by a roundtable discussion dedicated to the role of PCs in a radiation emergency. 
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Organizers envisioned the roundtable as a means of initiating a dialogue about the current and potential 
roles that PCs can play during a radiation emergency. 
METHODOLOGY 
A four-hour training session covered material ranging from basic radiation physics to NPDS coding of 
contamination with radioactive material and exposure to ionizing radiation. This session provided a 
knowledge refresher and common background for the roundtable participants (see Agenda in Appendix). In 
addition, a representative from the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists provided an overview of 
the National Alliance for Radiation Readiness. The training session was also available as a Webcast to all 57 
PCs across the country. After these presentations, participants were split into seven small groups, with one 
CDC facilitator per group, for the roundtable discussion using focused discussion questions.  
A total of 36 individuals participated in the 2-day roundtable (see Participant List in Appendix). Among 
the 36 participants were 11 medical toxicologists/medical directors (physicians), 11 clinical toxicologists/PC 
managers (pharmacists), and 11 Poison Specialists (nurses or pharmacists). They represented 32 PCs that 
serve 37 states and Puerto Rico. In addition, 3 public health officials representing Georgia and Alabama 
participated. Including the roundtable participants, 62 people attended the live activity in Atlanta.  
FINDINGS 
Current status of radiation emergency preparedness of poison centers 
The nation’s poison centers have limited experience with managing contamination with radioactive 
material or exposure to ionizing radiation. Currently, few poison centers have guidelines for managing 
either of these conditions. 
This limited experience is mainly attributable to the fact that both contamination with radioactive 
material and exposure to ionizing radiation are rare events. PCs in states with nuclear power plants tend to 
have more experience with these events, and may be better prepared than those without such experience 
to respond to radiation-related questions. However, even the PCs that have responded to radiation-related 
questions have only limited experience with radiation. 
 
The roundtable discussions identified two factors as useful resources for PCs dealing with radiation 
emergencies. The first factor is a good relationship between a PC and the state’s public health department 
and state radiation control program. The current status of relationships between PCs and their state public 
health departments and radiation control programs varies considerably from state to state. The second 
factor that PCs find helpful is the existence of guidelines and recommendations specific to management of 
contamination with radioactive material and exposure to ionizing radiation. Such guidelines could include 
template data collection forms containing important questions to ask and algorithms that assist in triage. At 
present, most PCs do not have any guidelines for such medical management. Developing new guidelines 
6 
 
and recommendations available to all PCs would be useful, and such development should be collaborative, 
involving AAPCC and other groups that can provide radiation subject matter expertise. For PCs in states 
with nuclear power plants, yet another way to increase their preparedness capabilities is to partner with 
the plant’s emergency response planning committees. 
PCs are primarily resources for providing information. Responding to questions from a surge of callers 
will be the main activity of PCs during a radiation emergency. It will be important for PCs to have a 
consistent message during such an evolving crisis. Toxicologists typically rely on their training, experience, 
and scientific studies as the basis for making recommendations. However there are limitations in both the 
knowledge and the experience toxicologists have about radiation. No consistent guidelines are available at 
all centers about how to respond to questions and incidents as they arise. 
Poison centers expect to receive calls from the public and health care providers after a radiation 
emergency; calls from the media may also occur. 
Following a radiation emergency, PCs anticipate receiving phone calls with a volume proportional to the 
magnitude of the incident. Calls could come from a variety of sources. Primary calls will come from the 
public seeking information and advice and possibly from media sources seeking information about an 
incident. PCs will also receive secondary calls from nurse advice lines, emergency departments, hospitals, 
and other institutions that are not adequately prepared to respond to persons contaminated with 
radioactive material or exposed to ionizing radiation and therefore will call a PC for recommendations. For 
example, it is likely that PCs will be called by health care providers about radiation MCMs (e.g., the use of 
Prussian blue) because such countermeasures are often considered antidotes.  
The general consensus among roundtable participants is that answering these calls is in line with the 
core mission of PCs. While PC personnel are not experts in radiation, they are adept at risk communication, 
health messaging, and information sharing. They therefore have the potential to assist a public health 
response after a radiation emergency. One key difficulty PCs anticipate in responding to calls is the staff’s 
general lack of knowledge about radiation-related health effects and consequences. PC staffs in general 
want to feel confident in the information and recommendations they share. Consequently, PC staffs need 
to increase their knowledge about radiation. Guidelines and recommendations that have been prepared in 
advance and in collaboration with other public health response partners would be valuable tools that PC 
staff could use to respond immediately to phone call inquiries. In terms of risk communications and health 
messaging, PCs would rely on working with public health officials to develop cohesive informational 
messages about incidents. PCs could then share and communicate these messages with the public. 
However, PCs anticipate facing pressure to answer questions independently in real-time before such 
messages are available from health officials, given the time it can take to craft a message. 
Contrary to the majority opinion, some participants had concerns that the public might not think to call 
PCs during a radiation emergency, given the general impression of the work PCs perform. Therefore, if it is 
desirable as part of the public health response, increasing the use of PCs can be accomplished by having 
other organizations (e.g., local or state health departments and federal agencies) send out messages to the 
public saying that PCs are ready and able to answer questions. As an example of such promotion by other 
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organizations, during the Deep Water Horizon incident on the Gulf Coast in 2010, the Environmental 
Protection Agency partnered with Gulf state PCs and released messages instructing the public to call the 
local PC for more information.  
Poison center call line surge capacity is limited; it is based entirely on local resources, and the current 
capacity of the aggregate system is unknown. 
If a public health radiation emergency occurs, the most proximal PC will likely be overwhelmed with 
calls. Such likelihood suggests a need for procedures by which PCs can route calls to other PCs and assist 
whatever local PC is most affected by the disaster. A key strength of PCs is that they are a national system. 
Following a radiation emergency, the most likely calls PCs are going to receive will be from concerned 
citizens potentially affected by it. An exception is that the PC covering the directly affected area will receive 
calls from truly exposed or contaminated persons and concerned citizens. Many PCs have capabilities for a 
call surge, including the use of remote agents to answer calls and mechanisms to forward calls to other 
centers. However, challenges are associated with PC call surge capacity.  
No global strategy exists at this time for using the existing PC toll-free number at the AAPCC level for 
improving PC surge capacity. Some individual PCs have local surge plans, though this may not be universal. 
The question of PC surge capacity was previously highlighted as part of the pandemic influenza response; 
CDC created a tool to help PCs with surge planning. Still, there is a need for more thorough surge capacity 
planning for PCs. 
Surge plans should include provisions for calling in additional PC staff to respond to incidents. Another 
important planning consideration is to identify partners in multilingual communities who can respond to 
and assist a PC with translation during an incident. 
An automated system capable of delivering just-in-time messages is another strategy to increase caller 
access to information. Such messages could reduce the need for public callers to speak with a live person. 
In addition, scripted frequently asked questions (FAQs) can be helpful in scaling the workforce. Such FAQs 
permit the use of less trained personnel (e.g., pharmacy, nursing, or medical students, members of the 
medical reserve corps) to answer many callers’ questions. Anything that falls outside the script can then be 
directed to available subject matter experts.  
If a PC can reassure concerned citizens and keep them at home, while identifying and referring those 
people who truly do need further evaluation and management, then doing so will extend the resources of 
the larger health care system response.  
Finally, surge planning should also include considerations for information technology support. 
Moreover, no surge plan will be of any use if it is not practiced. Surge plans should be exercised routinely. 
The National Poison Data System (NPDS), a tool used for surveillance, is better suited for tracking a 
known radiation emergency than for detecting covert incidents. NPDS can be extremely useful for 
situational awareness during incidents by helping guide public health response and messaging. 
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One major point of discussion was whether NPDS could be used as sentinel surveillance for detecting a 
covert radiation emergency. Because NPDS is a passive system, it relies on caller reports for information, as 
well as on the case data coded by the Poison Specialists (health care personnel who answer initial calls). 
Crucial to any surveillance using NPDS is use of the best coding possible. In a recent effort, CDC and AAPCC 
provided optimized NPDS radiation codes. However, these codes are not yet familiar to the majority of 
Poison Specialists throughout the PC system. Ways to improve coding include providing more training of 
Poison Specialists and building radiation-specific pop-up reminders and templates into PC electronic 
medical record database programs. However, participants raised concerns that these technological 
improvements can be costly. 
If an incident is known or suspected from the outset to involve a release of radioactive material and/or 
ionizing radiation, then NPDS possibly could be used for detecting such an incident, because Poison 
Specialists can use appropriate codes to describe the parameters of such an incident and trigger alerts. 
However, it seems more likely that other agencies would be contacted before PCs. Conversely, if an 
incident is not known to be radiation-related one must rely on syndromic surveillance, surveillance that is 
based on the clinical effects that are coded by Poison Specialists. Syndromic surveillance is much less likely 
to be successful for early detection of a radiation emergency. One way to detect cases involving silent 
contamination with radioactive material or exposure to ionizing radiation is to identify clusters of patients 
with common exposures or symptoms possibly associated with radiation. AAPCC and CDC are evaluating 
surveillance of this type. 
The NPDS database has national coverage and it provides near real-time monitoring of reported 
exposures. This capability was leveraged during the Japan nuclear power plant response when the database 
was used to identify issues raised by the general public and to create targeted public health messages to 
address such matters directly. During any future radiation emergency, the situational awareness offered by 
NPDS can be a crucial tool for public health officials. 
Potential role of poison centers during a public health radiation emergency 
The main role of poison centers during a radiation emergency is to provide accurate information to 
callers; however, PCs can also assist in several roles, including dissemination of important coordinated 
public health messages, caller triage and medical management, and performance of follow-up activities. 
PCs are well suited for distributing coordinated public health messages. For example, PCs might 
publicize information about community reception centers (CRCs) to the public and various local and state 
agencies (e.g., fire departments, emergency medical services, hospitals). CRCs are locations at which public 
health agencies and their partners can perform population monitoring (evaluation of people potentially 
exposed to radiation or contaminated with radioactive material) following a radiation emergency. As soon 
as health officials have made the determination to establish a CRC, PCs should be notified so that they can 
distribute such information to the public. 
There was widespread agreement among roundtable participants that PCs should be involved with 
triage and medical management of callers. PCs have always been involved in triage of callers, and they 
continue to perform triage daily as a matter of their usual business. The triage that PCs typically provide 
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involves determining what poisoning exposures can be handled at home and which require referral to a 
hospital emergency department. This PC function plays a crucial role in preventing the imposition of an 
unnecessary burden on health care facilities. PCs could make preliminary assessments of callers with 
contamination with radioactive material or exposure to ionizing radiation by using incident-specific 
algorithms and tools, such as those available on the Radiation Emergency Medical Management (REMM) 
web portal (http://www.remm.nlm.gov/). In addition, PCs can assist healthcare providers in emergency 
departments and other clinical settings with guidance about appropriate use of radiation countermeasures 
and other medically indicated therapy. Typical community physicians may not know how to treat these 
patients and may need to call PCs for assistance. 
PCs also routinely follow-up with callers to monitor outcomes and provide further recommendations if 
needed. This service could be helpful in the creation of a long-term registry of individuals contaminated 
with radioactive material or exposed to ionizing radiation. For example, after being evaluated at a CRC, the 
affected population can participate in follow-up activities via telephone with a PC. PCs also can perform 
follow–up activities over time and work with allied toxicology clinics that are part of the Association of 
Occupational and Environmental Clinics. A similar procedure was established for follow-up activities of 
American Red Cross first responders to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Lastly, it is critical that PC efforts 
be integrated with the efforts of other response agencies through ongoing communication and advance 
planning. 
Poison centers should be an important partner in unified public health messaging and risk communication 
after a radiation emergency. 
By default, because PCs will be receiving calls from the public, they will become part of the public 
messaging response during and after a radiation emergency. One dilemma for PCs is the need to respond to 
callers before coordinated messages are available from local, state, or federal government agencies. In this 
situation, PCs have two choices: use internal messages or use coordinated messages. Coordination of public 
messages will most often depend on the PCs’ pre-existing relationships with local, state, and federal 
agencies.  
Roundtable participants discussed several important considerations for public health messages: 
 Messages should be unified across the entire public health response (local, state, and federal). 
 Messages need to be tiered: a public/layperson tier and a health professional tier (e.g., two sets of 
FAQs) because each group has different needs. 
 PCs need to be involved when the messages are being written and delivered. PCs may not drive the 
message, but they will be receiving the questions. Therefore they can provide important 
information about what the public is asking and help tailor the messages appropriately during an 
incident. 
 PCs need notification of messages before the media receive them so that PCs can be ready to 
respond to questions about what public health officials are communicating. Most PCs have a 
working relationship with local media outlets and are often called upon by the media for comment 
on poisonings and toxic exposures. 
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 Multilingual messaging and information should be developed; however, creating materials for 
multilingual populations is very challenging. If materials are not prepared in advance and made 
available, specific language lines may be needed. However, such language lines generally are 
inadequate for handling on-the-spot messaging for multiple reasons, including the fact that 
translators usually have no medical training.  
Poison centers can act as a resource to provide information about radiation MCM use. 
Most likely, PCs will receive calls from health care providers with questions about radiation MCMs, 
often considered antidotes [e.g., Prussian blue, potassium iodide (KI), and Calcium/Zinc diethylene triamine 
pentaacetic acid (DTPA)]. PCs can serve as information resources about radiation countermeasures, 
particularly in answering questions related to administration, side effects, dosing, interactions with other 
medications, and contraindications. Roundtable participants believed that definitive recommendations 
regarding indications for MCMs will come from sources other than toxicologists at PCs. However, once 
definitive recommendations are available, PCs could distribute and follow them when assisting medical 
callers actively managing patients. 
From the PC’s perspective, active tracking of countermeasure use will be prohibitively difficult because 
of the passive nature of receiving calls. As an example, in Georgia the state health department asks that all 
medical providers consider calling the PC before giving the rabies vaccine to ensure that such treatment is 
warranted. However, the Georgia PC cannot track rabies vaccine stores in the state, partly because 
hospitals do not report their supplies but also because providers do not always call the PC before 
administering the vaccine. With a passive reporting system, PCs are called sporadically—only if there are 
questions about administration or if there are adverse effects. Consequently, PCs will not be able to track 
effectively the use of federal stores of countermeasures, given the logistical challenges.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The nation’s PCs will be involved during a public health radiation emergency. PCs should anticipate 
receiving phone calls as a consequence of such an incident, and they have many capabilities that can be of 
benefit during a public health response to an incident. The primary role of PCs during a response to a public 
health radiation emergency will be to provide accurate, uniform information to callers. However, other 
important roles may include using the NPDS to augment public health messaging and risk communication, 
assisting with caller triage and medical management, and supporting long-term follow-up activities.  
Currently, PC personnel have limited knowledge and experience regarding health effects and 
management of contamination with radioactive material and exposure to ionizing radiation. More training 
on these topics would improve the preparedness level of PC personnel and enhance response readiness. In 
addition, improving collaboration between PCs and local, state, and federal agencies is crucial to an 
effective public health response to radiation emergencies. 
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NEXT STEPS 
Improve radiation health training and education among poison center personnel. 
The kinds of training desired by PC personnel should be eligible for continuing education credit for 
physicians, nurses, and pharmacists.  It should include the following elements: 
 Frequent training on basic radiation knowledge, radiation-related health effects, and radiation risk 
communication. 
 NPDS coding of radiation-related calls, specifically for Poison Specialists. Roundtable participants 
indicated poor to no awareness of the new NPDS radiation codes. One way to make learning 
radiation coding a priority is to incorporate it into the continuing education process. 
 Online training modules involving persons either contaminated with radioactive material and/or 
exposed to ionizing radiation, with the purpose of teaching Poison Specialists what symptoms to 
look for and important questions to ask.  
 Disaster drills: PCs should partner with state public health departments to gain a larger role in state 
or federal drills.  
 Hands-on training sessions or simulations: educational offerings should be frequent and repeated. 
They should involve hands-on training and possibly use medical simulation to maximize retention of 
the learning material.  
Consolidate and share currently available resources across organizations. 
 Fact sheets about exposure to ionizing radiation, contamination with radioactive material, their 
health effects and management 
 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
 Educational training modules 
Develop a set of recommendations, toolkits, and public messaging FAQs for response to 
radiation emergencies. 
 Develop templates and information for evaluation of radiation-related calls to be used by Poison 
Specialists. 
 Develop tiered messages, including a layperson tier and a health professional tier. 
Assess current poison center surge capacity and investigate strategies for expanding such 
capacity on a national level. 
 Assessments should be made at both local and national system levels. 
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Integrate poison centers with the public health infrastructure across the country at local, 
state, and federal levels. 
 PCs have varying relationships with public health departments, and they would like more 
collaboration. From the PC perspective, perhaps the biggest challenge is to become viewed as 
partners in public health. PCs that serve multiple states have added difficulty because they need to 
develop relationships with multiple state public health departments. 
 Efforts toward this goal include CDC’s Communities of Practice 
(http://www.cdc.gov/phcommunities/).  
 All PCs should develop relationships with state health departments and state radiation control 
programs (http://www.crcpd.org/) to establish the PCs’ role as a source for information during 
radiation emergencies. 
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APPENDIX 
Opening Remarks 
The roundtable convened with welcoming remarks from Mr. Peter Edwards, Deputy Director of the 
Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects (DEHHE) at the National Center for Environmental 
Health (NCEH). He acknowledged the partnership of PCs with CDC, highlighting the immense contribution of 
PCs to public health. He highlighted the ability of PCs to provide near real-time surveillance of exposure and 
to document trends that help to identify new public health threats.  
The next speaker was Dr. Charles W. Miller, Branch Chief of the Radiation Studies Branch (RSB) at 
DEHHE/NCEH. He emphasized that the people of the United States are very concerned about radiation, and 
PCs definitely will receive phone calls from the public after a radiological/nuclear incident, regardless of the 
incident’s location.  
Ms. Debbie Carr, Executive Director of the American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC), 
was the final speaker of the introductory session. She noted that this meeting was very important for PCs 
because it recognizes the larger role PCs can assume in a public health radiation emergency response, and 
she stressed that AAPCC intends to remain involved in the future.  
Agenda 
Day 1 
08:00a–08:30a  Arrival and Registration  
08:30a–09:00a  Welcome and Introduction 
Peter Edwards, MPA, Deputy Director, Division of Environmental Hazards and 
Health Effects, National Center for Environmental Health, CDC 
Charles W. Miller, PhD, Branch Chief, Radiation Studies Branch, CDC 
Debbie Carr, MEd, Executive Director, American Association of Poison Control 
Centers 
09:00a–09:45a  Radiation Basics and Types of Radiation Disasters 
   Armin Ansari, PhD, Health Physicist, Radiation Studies Branch, CDC 
09:45a–10:15a  Injuries after Radiation Exposure 
Jeffrey Nemhauser, MD, Deputy Associate Director for Science, Office of Public 
Health Preparedness and Response, CDC 
10:15a–10:45a  Health Effects after Radioactive Contamination 
   Arthur Chang, MD, Medical Officer, Health Studies Branch, CDC 
10:45a–11:00a  Countermeasures in the Strategic National Stockpile 
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Susan Gorman, PharmD, MS, Associate Director for Science, Division of Strategic 
National Stockpile, OPHPR, CDC 
11:00a–11:15a  BREAK 
11:15a–11:45a  Epidemiologic Issues in Radiation Response 
   Colleen Martin, MSPH, Epidemiologist, Health Studies Branch, CDC 
11:45a–12:00p  National Alliance for Radiation Readiness 
Erin Simms, MPH, Associate Research Analyst, Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists 
12:00p–12:30p  Surveillance Using NPDS and Radiation Related Coding 
   Royal Law, MPH, Epidemiologist, Health Studies Branch, CDC 
12:30p–01:00p  Communication and Psychological Needs in Radiation Emergencies 
Leeanna Allen, MPH, MCHES, Health Education Specialist, Oak Ridge Institute for 
Science and Education 
01:00p–02:00p  LUNCH 
02:00p–04:00p  Small group discussion 1 
04:00p–05:00p  Large group discussion 1 
Ron Edmond, MEd, EdS, EdD, Group Manager, Oak Ridge Associated Universities 
Day 2 
08:00a–08:30a  Arrival & Registration  
08:30a–10:30a  Small group discussion 2 
10:30a–11:30a  Large group discussion 2 
Ron Edmond, MEd, EdS, EdD, Group Manager, Oak Ridge Associated Universities 
11:30a–12:00p  Roundtable Summary 
Arthur Chang, MD, Medical Officer, Health Studies Branch, CDC 
12:00p–12:30p  Closing Remarks 
   Charles W. Miller, PhD, Branch Chief, Radiation Studies Branch, CDC 
12:30p–01:30p  LUNCH 
01:30p–04:00p  CDC Emergency Operations Center Tour (optional) 
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